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Capitalism in India and the Small 
Industries Policy 
Nasir Tyabji 
It is instructive to look at the genesis of what has come to be known as the small industries deve-
lopment policy and to see whether it was at all possible in the early 1950s, given the already existing 
strength of large industry, for any government to have appreciably increased the strength of cottage and 
other small industry — and thus to have provided the jobs which, it is claimed, the policy actually 
implemented did not. 
For this purpose, we must examine the Congress's original views on the pattern of development it 
wished to see; the results of almost 20 years of debate following the 1929 Karachi resolution; and the 
opposition these views faced once Independence was a reality — both from large industrialists and from 
large landholders. Attempts were made by the large industrialists to bring about direct changes in policy, 
while the large landholders tried to preserve their economic and social interests through intervention 
largely at the more detailed policy-making stage and at the time of implementation. Though both types 
of obstruction had an impact on the final shape of the small industries policy, it is with the former that 
this paper is principally concerned. 
F O L L O W I N G the formation of the 
Janata government at the Centre after 
the March 1977 general election, the 
debate centred on the Gandhi vs Nehru 
model of development has considerably 
sharpened. Attempts have been made 
to show that various disturbing features 
of the Indian economy, sharply visible 
in social manifestations such as un-
employment, arc due to the misconcei-
ved economic development policies 
epitomised by the Second Five Year 
Plan.1 
The ant i -Nehru views would hold the 
visible strength of the large-scale fac-
tory sector at the present t ime, and its 
undoubted growth from the t ime of 
Independence, to be very largely the 
results of a conscious policy towards 
this end. They would see it to be an 
inherent, intended, result of the Congress 
party's commitment to 'Socialism — 
Nehru style'. They wou ld like to see 
an increased emphasis on small-scale 
product ion, preferably in the cottage 
industry sector; and a general shift in 
terms of development priorities towards 
rural development. In the present con-
text, this wou ld presumably mean in-
creased non-agricul tural employment in 
the rural areas, and improved agri-
culture, in terms of technology. 
The debate has been essentially poli-
tical , for the obvious reason that a new 
pol i t ica l party had come into power; 
and changes in development strategy 
needed to be jus t i f ied in terms of the 
need for such changes, w h i c h the al l-
too-apparent indicators, such as the con-
t inued existence of poverty and un-
employment, demonstrate. 
Such a strategy shift wou ld be jus t i -
fied if it could be shown that there was 
a direct link between the type of de-
velopment expected, in terms of the 
Five Year Plans, and the situation we 
are now in. In fact, the abandonment of 
p lanning from the mid-sixties onwards,3 
and the l i t t le change in terms of the 
negative fall-out from the 'Nehru Model ' 
over the last 13 years, would show that 
the results we see today are a conse-
quence of the inherent structure and 
workings of our socio-economic system. 
Put another way, we would argue that, 
if the level of poverty and unemploy-
ment and other social indicators of lack 
of performance during the Indira 
Gandhi years have not shown any de-
crease, it was not inherent in the Second 
Five Year Plan strategy that these pro-
blems are wi th us. Rather, their con-
t inued existence requires us to look 
deeper at the workings of the Indian 
economy. 
W i t h i n this context, it is instructive 
to look at the genesis of what has come 
to be known as the small industries 
development policy and to see whether 
it was at all possible in the early 1950s, 
given the already existing strength of 
large industry, for any government to 
have appreciably increased the strength 
of cottage and other small industry — 
and thus to have provided the jobs 
wh ich , it is claimed, the policy actually 
implemented d id n o t 
For this purpose, we must examine: 
the Congress's original views on the 
pattern of development it wished to see; 
the results of almost 20 years of debate 
fo l lowing the 1929 Karachi resolution; 
and the opposition these views faced 
once Independence was a reality — 
both from large industrialists and from 
large landholders. Attempts were made 
by the large industrialists to b r ing about 
direct changes in policy, whi le the large 
landholders tr ied to preserve their 
economic and social interests through 
intervention largely at the more detailed 
pol icy-making .stage and at the t ime of 
implementat ion. Though both types of 
obstruction had an impact on the final 
shape of the small industries policy, it 
is w i t h the former that we are pr inc i -
pally concerned. 
II 
Gandhi's emphasis on individual hand 
spinning as a form of regeneration of 
human dignity must be seen as the 
original source of the Indian Small In-
dustries Policy. Fol lowing his rise to 
ascendency w i t h i n the nationalist move-
ment after the 1919 Congress session, 
his ideas on the intrinsic meaning of 
Swaraj, were to gain a certain accep-
tance, however l i t t le in total i ty they may 
have fit ted in wi th the philosophy of 
most of the other prominent Congress-
men. However, w i th the practical re-
quirements of the nationalist movement 
and the need to provide work to Cong-
ressmen during periods of comparative 
inaction, the ini t ia l purely moral basis 
for supporting khadi soon assumed im-
portant economic consequence. The Al l 
India Spinners Association was establish-
ed in 1925. In the early 1930s support 
was successively extended to hand 
weaving, and to certain other types of 
small industry, even those employing 
workers on wages. This had been neces-
sitated by the boycott of foreign cloth 
and of British goods, of all kinds, and 
the need to develop indigenous sources 
of these goods. Whi le large-scale indi-
genous sources could not develop w i t h -
out State aid — wh ich was unl ikely at 
the time — Congress resources and 
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support could only help the develop-
ment of small-scale production of these 
items; and this position was formalised 
by the inauguration of the Al l India 
Village Industries Association in 1934. 
It was then natural that when the 
formation of the National Planning 
Committee was announced by the Cong-
ress President in 1938, w i t h Nehru as 
Chairman, that there should have been 
a sub-committee on cottage and small-
scale industries. Al though the main 
Gandhian representative on the sub-
committee resigned from the committee,3 
the Report was significant for integrat-
ing Gandhian concern for small-scale in-
dustry wi th Nehru's concern for clarifi-
cation of the role of publ ic sector, 
changes in agrarian relations, and other 
matters which had been stated in the 
1931 Bombay Congress Session resolu-
tion. 
W h a t we are suggesting is that the 
Reports of the National Planning Com-
mittee are important, in that, not only 
do they set out actual details of the 
type of ini t ia t ive to be taken by the 
State and by private sources. Primarily, 
their significance lies in that the specific 
balance between State and private sec-
tor initiatives reflects the balance of 
power between the various strata of so-
ciety which had combined wi th in the 
Congress to work for Independence. 
It was the Reports of the National 
Planning Committee wh ich formed the 
basis for the Congress Economic Pro-
grammes Committee report which was 
published in early 1948 — the first 
statement of economic policy by the 
Congress party — now w i t h the power 
of the State in its hands. 
Al though several large industrialists 
had been associated w i t h the National 
Planning Committee, and had them-
selves taken the init iat ive towards ad-
vocating a substantial role for the State 
in planned economic development in 
the Bombay Plan, the reaction to the 
Report of the Economic Programmes 
Committee was hostile. A few months 
earlier, the Minister for Industry and 
Supplies had convened a conference on 
Industrial Development in Delhi . It is 
clear that the purpose of the conference 
was to obtain agreement on the type 
and extent of State intervention accep-
table to the industrialists present. This 
indication of official (as opposed to 
Congress) th inking was formalised by 
the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution 
(IPR), and then incorporated into Cong-
ress ideology by instructions given to a 
further Committee4 to integrate the 
views of the IPR and those of the Cong-
ress Economic Programmes Committee, 
This step was probably decisive in 
br inging about some measure of agree-
ment between the Nehru group and the 
large industrialists. 
Regulation of the large-scale private 
sector, which was a compromise reached 
between those who advocated its natio-
nalisation, and1 those who wished to see 
the 'market given full play', was to be 
institutionalised through the Industrial 
Development and Regulation Act w h i c h 
went through two select Committees of 
the Lok Sabha, and f inal ly emerged, in 
consistency w i t h the development 
strategy formulated by the Planning 
Commission.5 
I l l 
The Indian strategy of economic de-
velopment had been considerably clari-
fied by the acceptance by the Lok 
Sabha of the First Five Pear Plan, and 
the passage of the Industrial Develop-
ment and Regulation Act ( IDRA), 6 The 
Five Year Plan suggested programmes 
of industrial development in addition to 
programmes in agriculture, social ser-
vices, and health. The I D R A defined 
the type of industrial uni t which wou ld 
be subject to State control, and the 
methods of control to be exercised. 
The Act laid down that all industrial 
undertakings coming w i t h i n specific in-
dustry groups, and of a size larger than 
a specified min imum would need to 
register themselves by a part icular date 
wi th an agency not i f ied by the govern-
ment. A proposal to establish a new 
undertaking w i t h i n the 'scheduled' in-
dustry, to relocate an existing under-
taking, or to undertake 'substantial' ex-
pansion plans would require the per-
mission of the government in the form 
of an industrial licence. The role of the 
government vis-a-vis the private sector 
was made explicit in this form, and the 
Act is probably the most important key 
to understanding the logic of the Indian 
industrial development strategy. For, 
not only did it prescribe the type of 
industrial uni t which came under its 
purview, it also defined by exclusion, a 
'small-scale sector' of small capitalist 
factories which were free of the licens-
ing regulations. 
The Fiscal Commission made a major 
conceptual advance in distinguishing 
between cottage industries and small-
scale industries on the wage labour 
cri terion, and the relationship between 
proprietors and workers.7 
A cottage industry is thus one wh ich 
is carried on wholly or primarily 
w i t h the help of members of the 
family , either as a whole or a part-
t ime occupation. A small-scale indus-
t ry , on the other hand, is one which 
is operated mainly w i t h h i red labour, 
usually 10 to 50 hands. 
Probably leading from this defini t ion, 
the Industr ial Development and Regula-
t ion Ac t exempted units employing less 
than 50 workers with power, and less 
than 100 workers without power, even 
from registration. As we shall see later, 
this exempted sector came to be known 
as the small-scale sector of factory 
units.8 
Nehru's stress on the necessity of 
planning had led to the formation of 
the Planning Commission and to the 
Five Year Plan. Similarly, the general 
acceptance of the need for control l ing 
the significant activities of the private 
sector had emerged in the form of 
I D R A . These two, as has keen mention-
ed, had defined an unregulated or small 
sector including capitalist units, and had 
defined plans for the development of 
this sector. A similar historical conti-
nuity existed as far as the actual con-
tent of the development agencies was 
concerned. A Cottage Industries Board 
had been established in 1947 to develop 
these types of industrial units.9 In 1952, 
the board was split into three separate 
boards responsible for Khadi and Vi l lage 
Industries, Handicrafts, and Handlooms, 
The Al l India Spinners Association and 
the Al l India Village Industries Asso-
ciation were amalgamated and formed 
the Khadi Board. The Handloom Board 
was an outcome of the immediate post-
war Handloom Board10 and the standing 
Handloom Committee of the Cottage 
Industries Board. 
Most units in these industrial groups 
represented very early stages of econo-
mic development. Artisan and small 
commodity product ion predominated, 
often subordinate to t rading capital. 
W i t h the hold of t rading capital as 
strong as it was, and w i t h Gandhians 
on the Khadi and Vi l lage Industries 
Board u n w i l l i n g to accept any changes 
in technology, the road to development 
of these t radi t ional industries was vir-
tually closed; of course, this was pre-
cisely what the Gandhians wanted — 
the supply of consumer goods from 
Vil lage and cottage' industries essen-
t ial ly using tradit ional technology and 
no wage labour.11 However, the require-
ments of general economic development 
were quite opposed to this philosophy. 
In 1954, a Small-Scale Industries Board 
was established to encourage the growth 
of industrial units not covered by the 
existing boards, and free of I D R A 
regulations. 
A l though the Small-Scale Industries 
Board (SSIB) and related institutions 
were not totally new concepts,12 their 
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formation at a time substantially later 
than the other Boards, and from the 
time the need for such a Board 
had first been voiced, requires some 
explanation, it seems that the need to 
provide specific measures to deal w i t h 
the urban educated unemployed, which 
had been a matter of some concern,13 
coincided wi th the willingness of the 
Ford Foundation office in Delhi to 
provide the services of a team to 
examine, in concrete, the requirements 
of small capitalist and transitional-to -
capitalist units. 
T T Krishnamachari, who was the 
Minister for Commerce and Industry 
when the team submitted its report, 
expressed the government's view of the 
problem arising from the explicit emer-
gence of unemployment in a speech to 
the L o k Sabha.14 
He pointed out that the traditional 
Indian social structure based itself on 
the jo in t or undivided family, and that 
in such families unemployment or 
underemployment was not readily ap-
parent. It was when industrialisation — 
and the demands of urban l i fe that this 
gave rise to — led to the dissolution of 
the jo in t family, that unemployment be-
came apparent. 
Therefore, he impl ied , unemployment 
was not increasing. Rather, it was be-
coming obvious and the process that 
was making it obvious, viz, industrialisa-
tion, was also the only process that 
could remove underemployment, whe-
ther hidden or obvious. However, as 
the process of construction of large fac-
tories would necessarily be slow, it was 
important to protect traditional manu-
facturing activities from decay. 
This would appear both a reasonable 
analysis of the situation and a good 
rationale for the policies adopted by 
the Government of India. It was also 
an unexceptionable proposition that ex-
isting units in rural areas wou ld need 
to improve their techniques of produc-
tion, if increased demand for the goods 
produced by these units was to lead to 
higher incomes for those working in 
them.15 However, what was clearly con-
troversial was the methods by which the 
demand for these rural units was to 
increase. For this to happen, a specific 
share of the market would have to be 
reserved for such units and methods 
wou ld have to be devised whereby the 
goods could be transported and market-
ed in areas where substantial demand 
arose. 
Both these measures involved a clear 
attack on dominating economic and so-
cial interests in urban and rural areas. 
For, a common production programme, 
if effective, would have eaten into the 
growing mass market, which was pre-
cisely the major attraction of poli t ical 
independence and economic growth for 
the industrialists in the country. More-
over methods of bringing rural units into 
contact w i th urban markets (these being 
the quickest growing and most concen-
trated) or even the informal rural mar-
kets, would require the development of 
co-operatives. In all the talk of the 
'evil of the middleman' , there was no 
trace of awareness that these middle-
men were part of the elite, relative to 
the producer, and that co-operatives, in 
signifying an init iat ive in favour of the 
producer by the State, were simulta-
neously oriented against the economic 
and social interests of the elite.16 
The point was that, whi le a common 
production programme could be intro-
duced through executive action, and de-
fended by executive interests which saw 
this defence as their purpose, the co-
operative movement was a poli t ical 
movement and could not be projected 
by officials. Al though T T Krishnama-
chari appeared to be against the forma-
tion of an extension service, which 
would have been necessary for any offi-
cial attempt at the growth of the co-
operative movement, on the grounds of 
the resources this would require, he was 
probably well aware of the poli t ical 
dimensions of the problem.17 
In the circumstances, the problem 
was to prise effective control of the de-
velopment of small-scale production 
away from the Gandhians, whose posi-
t ion on self-employment and co-opera-
tives was proving far more embarrassing 
than their apparent opposition to 
modernisation of techniques. A further 
advantage of the organisational dis-
juncture between 'cottage and village' 
and '.small-scale industries' was that the 
Gandhians could be left to do whatever 
they could, through voluntary agencies. 
They would have no further reason to 
demand of the government that it re-
orientate its entire development strategy 
around the class of industries under 
their control. That is to say, executive 
support for small-scale industries, which 
would ensure that the social stratum re-
presented by these industries had their 
point of view considered in policy for-
mulation, was feasible for those indus-
tries which were 'ancillary' to the 
growth of capitalism; the cottage indus-
tries inevitably had to die in any long-
term view of the economy and their 
proponents could not have any voice in 
executive decision-making.16 
IV 
The International Team sponsored by 
the Ford Foundation arrived in India 
in late 1953. The Government of India 
provided a liaison officer of the rank of 
Joint Secretary, and the team presented 
its report after a three-month tour of 
the country in early 1954.19 
The team consisted of five members, 
of which two, including the chairman, 
were Swedish, whi le the remainder 
were from the Uni ted States. The 
occupations of the members of the team 
are of interest:20 
Chairman (Sweden) ... Vice pr incipal 
and acting principal of the Swedish 
Institute For Higher Education in 
Trades and Handicrafts. 
Member (Sweden). . . Managing Direc-
tor of the Swedish Federation of 
Small Industries and Crafts. 
Member ( U S A ) . . . Consultant in de-
velopment of handicrafts and 
specialised small -industry. 
Member ( U S A ) , . . Specialist on co-
operatives. 
Member (USA) ... Industrial engineer. 
As can be seen from the list, the 
team had experience and expertise in 
specific technical and managerial areas. 
It is thus not surprising that they tended 
to identify only those problems that 
their knowledge enabled them to re-
cognise. The report consisted of seven 
chapters on the fol lowing subjects: 
(1) Multipurpose Institutes of Tech-
nology for Small Industries, 
(2) Design and Methods of Supply 
for Quality Products in Handi-
crafts, Art crafts, and a Specialis-
ed Sector of Small Industries. 
(3) Credit and Finance. 
(4) Trade Associations. 
(5) Co-operatives. 
(6) The Industrial Process — Its 
Implementation. 
(7) Marketing and Distr ibut ion. 
The assumptions underlying the 
choice of both the members of the team 
and the subjects covered by the report 
was that the major problem affecting 
the growth of small units was a lack of 
systematic planning wi th in the un i t it-
self. If standardisation in the quality of 
products could be ensured through the 
provision of credit and marketing chan-
nels, then small-scale units could be 
moved from the position of 'uncompeti-
tive units' w i th in an essentially neo-
classical, perfectly competitive, economy 
to that of thr iving 'growth points' in the 
economy. 
It is significant that the team did not 
consider the question of entrepreneur-
ship. The report is concerned mainly 
wi th the problems of existing enter-
prising small industry, and not w i th 
developing new units by persons wi th -
out a background in trade or industry.21 
The world view implicit in the Report 
assumed that the basic problem of 
State aid to industries was to separate 
the grain — those units which could 
be made viable through aid of this 
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type, from the chaff — where no 
amount of aid would succeed in making 
the unit viable. The very different fac-
tors which might distinguish the grain 
from the chaff — such as the level of 
indebtedness, the access to r a w materials, 
the ability to manipulate regulatory 
measures, and so on — were in this 
view to be included wi th in the last 
factor — viz, risk-taking ability. Coming 
as they did from advanced industrialised 
societies, members of the team could 
not conceive of a socio-economic and 
cultural mil ieu different from their 
own. For them, any hard-working syste-
matic entrepreneur was bound to suc-
ceed. 
The team had been asked to exclude 
from its consideration 'small industry' 
— here taken to mean non-factory 
units — which were already covered by 
the K V I B . Although they did examine 
some problems of handicrafts, they 
were concerned essentially wi th mecha-
nised small industry. both from the 
point of view of their own expertise 
and concern, and the strong, feelings 
the K V I B had about industries in its 
own care. 
The most important recommendations 
of the team were the establishment of 
a number of Regional Institutes of 
Technology to be administered by an 
officer responsible to the Government 
of India, and a Small Industries Cor-
poration which was to help small-scale 
units to tender to Government for con-
tracts, W i t h the acceptance by the 
government of these two proposals, a 
stage was reached where persons in 
ownership of small production units 
had an institutional mechanism by 
which their interests as a group could 
be communicated to the government.22 
The final stage in the integration of 
small-scale industries, as a component 
of the structure envisaged as intrinsic 
to the Indian economic development 
strategy, came wi th the Second Five 
Year Plan. The Mahalanobis Model, 
which formed the basis of investment 
decisions in this plan, laid down that the 
supply of consumer goods which would 
be required to meet the increased de-
mand for wage goods would be largely 
supplied by small-scale production units. 
By relying on these types of units, 
several social and political objectives 
could also be met, and the Plan docu-
ment was eloquent in describing the 
advantages of small-scale industries. 
It is in fact, this role of small indus-
tries as providers of consumer goods 
that gives importance to the study of 
the origin of the small industries policy. 
For it is the reliance on this group of 
units, and the emphasis on investments 
in Department 1 industries, which 
serves as the delineating feature of 
Indian economic development up to at 
least the end of the Th i rd Five Year 
Plan. It is for this reason that, in the 
next section, we elaborate the logic of 
the aims laid out for the promotion of 
small industries and consider the extent 
to which these units could, in the ab-
sence of complementary measures, ex-
pect to contribute to the achievement of 
these aims.23 
V 
The Second Five Year Plan, in 
establishing a case for the promotion of 
small industries had made the following 
points in their favour: 2 4 
They provide immediate large-scale 
employment, they offer a method of 
ensuring a more equitable distribu-
tion o f the national income and they 
facilitate an effective mobilisation of 
resources of capital and skill which 
might otherwise remain unutilised. 
Some of the problems that unplanned 
urbanisation tends to create will be 
avoided by the establishment of small 
centres of industrial production all 
over the country. 
Development of small-scale industry 
was thus seen as a way of serving the 
fol lowing objectives: 
(1) Employment generation. 
(2) An equitable distribution of 
national income. 
(3) Mobilisation of capital. 
(4) Mobilisation of entrepreneurial 
skill. 
(5) Regional industrial dispersal. 
It is possible to regroup these five 
objectives into a group of three as 
follows: 
(A) An equitable distribution of na-
tional income, mobilisation of 
capital, mobilisation of entrepre-
neurial skill. 
(B) Employment generation. 
(C) Regional industrial dispersal. 
Measures to bring about a reasonably 
equitable distribution of national income 
are a normal practice followed by 
'welfare' states, and the Indian Consti-
tution is clear about the desirability of 
such measures. The most efficient me-
thod is obviously to increase public 
welfare measures, financed by suitable 
fiscal means, to provide a wide range 
of goods and services in the form of 
public services. However, in the Indian 
context, the existence of a highly 
skewed income and wealth distribution 
at the time of Independence implied 
that substantial redistribution would in-
volve very steeply progressive taxation 
on a very narrow base, leading both to 
tax avoidance and to disincentives, 
wi th in the context of a capitalist 
economy, to savings and investment. A 
second approach would be to generate a 
large number of small centres of capital 
accumulation, through providing both 
opportunities for the development of 
industrial capitalism, and the support 
measures required by the two most 
prominent sources of such capital — 
the representatives of merchant capital, 
and those of early forms of capitalist 
and small commodity production. Whi le 
the former would require the assurance 
of markets sufficient to lead to expanded 
reproduction, and of technical support 
to help in the conversion to operation 
as industrial capitalists, the latter would 
require augmentation — taking into ac-
count both the value and the material 
content — of their instruments of pro-
duction, and of loans provided by the 
State to enable them to invest propor-
tionately in raw materials and labour 
power. 
The first objective, then, could be 
seen to be the development of small 
industrial capitals which would be in-
tegrated into the general scheme of 
extended reproduction of capital, by 
ensuring the realisation of the values of 
the commodities they produced in ex-
change for variable capital, part of the 
surplus used for personal consumption 
by capitalists in Departments I and II 
("production of consumer goods"), and 
part of constant capital in Department 
II ("production of simple capital 
goods"). The conversion of merchant 
capital to industrial capital — the more 
painful form of transition to capitalist 
production as Marx noted — by the 
supply of machinery on a hire-purchase 
basis, and the supply of money capital 
in the form of loans to small commodity 
producers to hasten their process of pre-
capitalist accumulation, were the 
methods to be used. 
The second objective, that of employ-
ment creation, has two aspects differen-
tiated by the social origin of the un-
employed. The first group — the 
educated unemployed — must have 
come largely from the propertied classes 
during that period;25 and the flow of 
unemployed can largely be related to 
demographic distortions — in the sense 
that the section of society depending 
on the surplus extracted from the pro-
duction process appeared unable to 
match the rate of human reproduction 
to the surplus available. Or, to put it 
another way, they were inhibited at the 
subjective level by social conventions 
from transferring surplus from the 
consumption to the accumulation fund,26 
The second group of unemployed who 
suffered as much from the deficiency 
of capital accumulation came, by and 
large, from the petty bourgeois sec-
1725, 
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tions, the smaller peasantry, and the 
urban ' informal sector'. These were 
largely uneducated, and wou ld under 
normal capitalist development and d i f -
ferentiation of the peasantry, have 
formed the working class. Small-scale 
industrial product ion provided an avenue 
of employment closed otherwise ' to 
them, both because of the slow rate of 
growth of the large capitalist sector and 
the large amounts of capital investment 
which were required to generate a job 
in the large-scale sector (particularly in 
the Department I industries where the 
priorities of the development plait had 
dictated that the bulk of publ ic invest-
ment wou ld lie). 
The th i rd objective, of regional dis-
persal of industrial activity is, in many 
ways, the most interesting. Regional 
dispersal policies in advanced capitalist 
countries are ways of reducing urban 
congestion. In India, although the same 
reasoning was used, essentially the 
policy wou ld have had to develop 
capitalism in areas where commodity 
circulation rather than commodity pro-
duction prevailed. In other words, 
industrial capitalism in India was un-
evenly spread both across the capitalist 
class (i e, concentration of capital had 
taken place wi thou t there being much-
of a base in terms of numerous small 
capitals), and geographically, across 
the country. Thus attempts in the 1960s 
to identify 'backward' areas in terms of 
indices of infrastructural development 
are to be seen essentially as methods 
of locating areas where industrial capi-
talism (both in the sphere of produc-
t ion and circulation) had been unable 
to make any substantial advance.27 It 
wou ld be in these areas that merchant 
and usurer capital would hold relatively 
greater sway. For, in the absence of 
the product ion of wage goods on the one 
hand, and the wage income generated 
by such productive activities on the 
other, the bulk of the populat ion woulcj 
be forced to depend on representatives 
of merchant capital for the wage goods 
they required; and w i t h low and un-
stable incomes, on usurers (not neces-
sarily individual ly distinct from mer-
chants) for the money resources to buy 
these requirements on the other.28 Thus 
backward areas are backward in the 
scientific sense in terms of the low 
development of industrial capitalism, of 
which indices of infrastructure develop-
ment are the physical indications. 
Under these conditions, the State 
may approach the problem of integrat-
ing the economic activities involv ing 
the populat ion in backward areas into 
the national scheme of extended repro-
duction in a number of ways. The first 
is the induct ion of capitalist units of 
product ion in such areas, specifically 
in the Department I industries, on the 
reasonnig that their technical integra-
tion into the national reproduction 
scheme, will of itself enable them to 
serve as a centre for the outward 
radiation of industrial capitalism.29 This 
process, similar to the ini t ia l induction,;, 
of large-scale factory industry into the 
economy in the mid-19th century, 
migh t be successful if 'downstream' 
units were to develop proportionately, 
leading to a sufficient concentration of 
populat ion to just i fy the provision of 
goods and services in an organised 
manner, thus undermining the role of 
merchant and usurer capi ta l Various 
complementary measures in terms of 
the development of means of communi-
cation, and of freight rates at a level 
sufficient to induce private investment 
in the geographic proximity of such 
areas, wou ld be necessary for such a 
policy to succeed. 
The second approach is through the 
independent development of industries 
in Department I I , on the assump-
t ion that markets for the realisa-
t ion of the value of the commo-
dities existed, or could be deve-
loped through the generation of wage 
incomes. It is in this context that the 
controversy over large ' or 'small' 
industry developed; whether it was the 
former or the latter wh ich could act as 
the ' leading ' element in the inplanta-
tion of industry in areas dominated by 
antique forms of capital.30 The discus-
sion appeared to be carried on at an 
abstract level. And the asserted role of 
small-scale units as a means of mob i l i -
sing existing stocks of money capital, 
led to the view that as there were 
unlikely to be large concentrations of 
money capital in these backward areas, 
small-scale product ion would be the 
most that individuals l iv ing in the area 
in question could aspire to. Thus the 
argument for the growth of 'local 'capita-
lists' led logically to the position of 
extolling the virtues of small-scale units 
as a means of developing industrial 
capital — thus completely overlooking 
the outmoded social consciousness of 
the representatives of merchant and 
usurer's capital, even in cases where the 
objective conditions were in favour of 
capitalist development.81 The failure to 
olrtain a response in many cases to the 
measures for development of small-scale 
product ion led to increasing emphasis 
being laid on subsidies in the form of 
tax and excise relief, infrastructure 
development at subsidised charges, and 
so on.32 The mistake, if it can be called 
that, lay in assuming that incentives of 
a developed industrial capitalist type 
could induce the flow from earlier forms 
to industrial capitalist activity, of capital 
accumulated through trade or money-
lending. Iri the absence of such change, 
it wou ld be capitalists from outside who 
wou ld come to take advantage of the 
subsidies offered. 
The Second Plan document had also 
assumed that existing small industry 
would be protected from inroads into 
their markets of the products of deve-
loping large industry — specifically that 
range of small industry which lay 
outside the bigger towns. This would 
logically have required measures reserv-
ing items of product ion for small-scale 
production, and freezing of existing 
capacity of large units which were at 
that time located mostly in metropoli-
t an areas.33 
VI 
By the end of the Second Five Year 
Plan period, it was clear that not only 
had small industry not developed 
appreciably outside the large urban 
centres, but that there appeared to 
have been no substantial State support 
for measures to encourage such disper-
sal.34 The principal subjective reason 
for this lay, according to the Report of 
the Work ing Group on Small-Scale 
Industries, reporting on the programme 
of work for the Th i rd Five Year Plan 
that during the Second Plan:* 5 
The aim, according to this (Karve) 
Committee was to bu i ld up . . . a pyra-
midal structure of industry broad 
based on a progressive rural economy 
and the growth of small industrial 
units coupled w i t h necessary services 
among the big villages and small 
towns all over the country. . . 
The subjective basis for the lack of 
positive support lay then in the fact 
that the Karve Committee was domi-
nated by Candhians, supporters of the 
continuing existence of small commo-
dity production, which in the forms of 
village craft activities, was very largely 
dispersed in any case. They saw no 
reason to suggest specific measures for 
the decentralisation of 'modern' small 
industry. These they wou ld probably 
have considered not deserving of special 
attention; for, like large industry, these 
employed wage labour, and were not 
in this specific sense 'decentralised*.3* 
The Karve Committee Report may be 
seen to be the last attempt by represen-
tatives of small commodity producers 
(together wi th the resolution on Co-
operative Farming passed at the Con-
gress session in 1956), to establish 
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policies of development on the assump-
t ion that the State primarily subserved 
the interests of these strata of produ-
cers. In other words, regional dispersal 
policies during the Second Plan period 
were the prime victims of the clash at 
the administrative level between re-
presentatives of small commodity and 
small capitalist producers, 
The beginning of the 1960s saw a new 
ini t ia t ive for regional development of 
industrial capital. At the pol i t ical level, 
Jayaprakash Narain, carefully dissocia-
ting himself from the supporters of 
small commodity economy, emphasised 
in a note to the Planning Commission 
that the benefits of the policy for the 
development of a small capitalist class 
had been concentrated during the 
earlier plan periods on the urban, and 
more developed, parts of the country;3 7 
he clarified that his suggested approach 
did not mean that the use of power 
and of wage labour precluded from 
attention industries requir ing these by 
any agency concerned w i t h regional 
industrial development. 
At the official level, the Third Plan 
Work ing Group had suggested that the 
industrial estate could be used as a tool 
of regional planning, as long as the 
estates were planned w i t h sufficient 
regard for their economic feasibility,38 
Thus estates were seen as a method of 
implant ing a more or less complete 
cycle of reproduction of capital, in 
areas where it was likely that the 
objective conditions were favourable to 
the integration of this cycle into the 
surrounding product ion relations, and 
the development of these relations in 
parallel w i t h the capitalistically advan-
ced 'centre'. 
Industrial estates had been developed 
in England, as a means of reducing 
urban congestion through the planned 
relocation of industrial units outside 
urban centres, although close to them. 
In other words, they were a means of 
bringing about the super structural 
coincidence, in terms of zonal town 
planning, of the development of indus-
trial capitalism wi th a clear division of 
labour between the sphere of product ion 
and of circulation. In this they succeed-
ed, for the objective conditions had 
been correctly assessed; but the chances 
of their succeeding in achieving very 
different objectives in the Indian context 
depended on the industr ia l units wh ich 
were set up on the estates serving 
sufficiently complementary functions so 
that, as we have ment ioned above, an 
almost complete cycle of reproduction 
existed. In the absence of this, estates 
could funct ion only where- the market 
for the realisation of the values produced 
existed in geographic proximi ty (either 
larger urban centres, or in the case of 
an ancillary estate, large-scale industry). 
Primarily in response to the note by 
J P Narain, the Planning Commission 
constituted a Rural Industries Planning 
Committee in 1961, and developed a 
scheme for the development of small 
industries in backward areas. In signifi-
cant contrast to earlier schemes whose 
intention was to develop village level 
small i n d u s t r y — t h e Pilot Projects for 
village and small industry based in com-
muni ty blocks3* — and the Intensive 
Areas Scheme of the Khadi and Village 
Industries Commission40 — the Rural 
Industries Scheme based itself on a 
populat ion of 3 to 5 lakhs and thus im-
pl ic i t ly assumed the growth of fair ly 
substantial commodity markets. Al though 
emphasis was laid on the development 
of co-operatives for ' traditional vil lage 
industry* it seemed clear that these 
were holding operations, the greatest 
stress being laid on the ini t iat ion of 
new small industrial units. It is signifi-
cant in this context that the Report on 
the schemes refers to the ' l imited ' deve-
lopment possible in the case of t radi-
tional village industry.*1 In addi t ion, 
whi le it specifically mentions the need 
to avoid competition from the products 
of large-scale industry vis-a-vis small 
industry, the possibilities of competit ion 
between small commodity production is 
not mentioned. It appears that the ap-
proach was now to allow the natural 
forces of capitalist development, at the 
lower ends, to operate to destroy small 
commodity production, although it is 
probably true that in areas where there 
were substantial pockets of small com-
modity production, capitalist competi-
tion was prohibited. 
V I I 
Three specific attempts were made by 
official agencies in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to develop small industry 
in rural areas. The purpose of these 
projects was to experiment w i t h the 
possible methods of institutional sup-
por t to small-scale units, in terms of 
administrative procedures and arrange-
ments, in addition to the actual develop-
ment of small-scale units. 
The first of these attempts were the 
Pilot Projects Schemes of the Ministry 
of Community Development and Co-
operation. This consisted essentially of 
organisational arrangements for co-
ordinating developmental work already 
under way through the state government 
Department of Industries, and the A l l 
India Boards for Small-Scale Industries, 
Handlooms and 50 on. The evaluation 
committee for this scheme pointed to 
two major defects in their design. First, 
there were no specific funds sanctioned 
for the schemes, which had in the 
circumstances to suffer from the r ig id i ty 
bui l t into the schemes in existence which 
had been sanctioned by the A l l India 
Boards. Secondly, no attempt appears 
to have been made to translate the 
broad objectives of the scheme into a 
series of concrete practical steps which 
could be fol lowed by administrators at 
the field level to achieve these objectives. 
Both of these failings are essentially 
those of an organisation new to the task 
of active intervention in the economic 
decision making of private individuals. 
However, a more serious drawback was 
the lack of any insistance on the regio-
nal planning element. As the Perspective 
Planning Team of the Ford Foundation 
said in 1963 about an agenda item for 
the forthcoming meeting of the Small 
Scale Industries Board: 
A requirement that half of the total 
allocation for small-scale industries 
and industrial estates be spent in vil-
lages wi th less than 5000 populat ion 
would, if enforced, be likely to lead 
to waste, misdirected effort, and 
frustration. Not only does the setting 
of expenditure targets in thus way 
encourage i l l considered projects, but , 
even more fundamental, the attempt 
to implant modern industry on an 
extensive scale directly into villages of 
5000 people or less is unsound deve-
lopment policy. 
The emphasis that the Team 5 Report 
placed on the geographical aspect of 
the suitabili ty of a population agglo-
meration for industrial development, and 
the fact that they recognised that small 
factory based industry was not in itself, 
the most suitable vehicle for regional 
industrial development, indicates that 
they were aware of the objective con-
straints on the process of developing 
industrial capitalism. They suggested 
that regional planning should be an 
integral part of the national planning 
process and that programmes for deve-
lopment of small industry in less deve-
loped areas could succeed only wi th in 
such a framework, 
However, neither the major conclu-
sions of the Community Development 
Project, nor the th inking infusing the 
Ford Foundation Team's Report, ap-
pears to have influenced the other major 
official effort, the Planning Commission's 
Rural Industries Projects. The problem 
appears to have been that the state 
governments were unwi l l ing to under-
take measures of the k ind required for 
effective regional planning, and the short-
term poli t ical benefits from unexpected 
expenditure in the so-called backward 
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areas seem to have won over any urge 
towards serious efforts at the develop-
ment of industr ial capitalism. The eva-
luat ion report of the Rural Industries 
Project, unfortunately is less perceptive 
in locating the reason for the projects' 
failure in any meaningful sense, than the 
earlier report, bu t it can reasonably be 
concluded that bo th on account of sub-
jective fai l ings, and the narrow spread 
of these special efforts, industrial capi-
talism developed in the period f rom 
1961 to 1971 due to normal processes, 
unaided by State action to any extent, 
at least as far as small capitalist produc-
t ion was concerned. 
VIII 
A major failing in enunciating official 
policy was the lack of clarity over whe-
ther the small industries programme was 
pr imari ly a vehicle for developing small 
capitalists, or on increasing industrial 
product ion in the aggregate from small 
units. The distinction is important for 
if small capitalists were the major focus, 
then there should have been clearer 
efforts to increase the number of ind i -
viduals starting small units; on the other 
hand, if the purpose was to increase 
product ion, the focus w o u l d have been 
to increase the number and size of 
units irrespective of whether two or 
more units were owned by the same 
ind iv idua l or family group. 
In actual fact, inabi l i ty to obtain a 
Tegular flow of individuals from the 
originally specified target group — the 
educated unemployed — together w i t h 
the need to show that the number of 
small units was increasing in tandem 
wi th their share in national output , 
meant that emphasis was la id on proven 
performers. These were businessmen 
already in industry, or their sons, or 
those who could ensure both marketing 
facilities and some ' pu l l ' by al lying 
themselves to a large industrial uni t . 
The point is that ind iv idua l administra-
tive units involved in implement ing 
schemes for the development of small 
industry cannot be blamed for this. For, 
they operated w i th in the confines of a 
pol i t ica l lack of clarity wh ich appears 
to have been a result of attempts to 
patch over the divergent economic inter-
ests of different strata of industrialists. 
We have attempted to show in this 
paper that alterations and adjustments to 
the small industries policy since Inde-
pendence can be seen to be very largely 
the results of adjustments to economic 
realities expressed in terms of the 'punch' 
which different social strata hold in our 
society. The fact that Nehru may have 
he ld views wh ich differed in emphasis 
from those of his critics is to be seen 
as an indicat ion of his clear vision of 
the possibilities open to any government 
which wished to move forward on some 
points even if this migh t not be whol ly 
in tune w i t h his preferred overall path 
of advance. Crit icising Nehru's policies 
for the present i l k of our society is thus 
a diversion from the major sources of 
these ills, unless the critic is able to 
show how a new alignment of economic 
interests may be brought about w i t h i n 
the contours of today's socio-economic 
system. 
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